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BACKGROUND: Because specialty care accounts for half of Medicare 
expenditures, improving its value is critical to the success of Medicare 
accountable care organizations (ACOs) in curbing spending growth. 
However, whether ACOs have reduced low-value specialty care without 
compromising use of high-value services remains unknown.
METHODS AND RESULTS: Using national Medicare data, we identified 
2 cohorts: beneficiaries for whom the value of coronary revascularization 
is lower (those with ischemic heart disease without angina, congestive 
heart failure, or recent admission for acute myocardial infarction) and 
beneficiaries for whom its value is higher (those with recent acute 
myocardial infarction admission). We then determined the provider groups 
who cared for the cohorts, distinguishing between those participating 
(n=298) and those not participating in a Medicare ACO (1329). After 
measuring the provider groups’ use of coronary artery bypass grafting 
and percutaneous coronary intervention among the 2 cohorts, we 
fit multivariable models to test the statistical significance of rates of 
change in low- and high-value revascularization after ACO participation. 
During the pre-ACO period, participating and nonparticipating provider 
groups had similar rates of low- and high-value revascularization. Our 
multivariable model results show that rates of change for low- and high-
value coronary revascularization were not altered by a provider group’s 
participation in a Medicare ACO (lower value: difference, −0.04 per year; 
95% confidence interval, −0.11 to 0.03; higher value: difference, 0.96 
per year; 95% confidence interval, −0.46 to 2.4).
CONCLUSIONS: We found no association between provider group 
participation in a Medicare ACO and use of low- or high-value coronary 
revascularization.
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Given Medicare’s projected increases in spending,
1 
many hope that the expansion of accountable 
care organizations (ACOs) will help curb future 
spending growth. Accounting for nearly half of all 
Medicare expenditures,2,3 attention must be paid to ex-
pensive specialty care, particularly cardiovascular servic-
es, such as coronary revascularization, which make an 
outsize contribution to spending.4 Yet, when the lead-
ers of Medicare ACOs were recently surveyed about 
their organizations’ early strategic plans for achieving 
shared savings, conspicuously missing was any mention 
of specialty care.5
However, Medicare ACOs have the potential to 
influence specialty care substantially. A core premise of 
ACOs is shared accountability in patient management 
and coordination between primary and specialty care. 
Because participants are held to quality and spending 
targets for not only the services that they provide but 
also the care delivered by others, ACO primary care 
physicians may lead specialists to limit a procedure’s 
use in situations where its value is low. They might 
also steer referrals toward specialists who provide 
higher value care. Furthermore, collective incentives 
may motivate specialists participating in ACOs to low-
er their costs by reducing procedures among marginal 
patients. On the contrary, ACO financial pressures may 
bluntly discourage use of all procedures, regardless of 
their value.
To better understand the effects of Medicare ACOs 
on specialty care, we analyzed national Medicare 
claims from beneficiaries with ischemic heart disease, 
who were candidates for coronary revascularization. 
Coronary revascularization is an ideal procedure to 
study given that its value to patients varies substan-
tially from scenarios where it can be lifesaving (acute 
myocardial infarction [AMI]) to those where its value 
is less certain (asymptomatic ischemia). We deter-
mined the provider groups who cared for these ben-
eficiaries, distinguishing between those participating 
and those not participating in a Medicare ACO. We 
then compared coronary revascularization use among 
these groups before and after ACO implementation 
to assess whether ACOs reduced population-based 
rates of low-value procedures without affecting high-
value specialty care.
METHODS
Data Source and Study Population
Our analyses were based on national Medicare claims from a 
20% random sample of beneficiaries, including data from the 
Carrier, Denominator, Medicare Provider Analysis and Review, 
and Outpatient research identifiable files, allowing us to cap-
ture both inpatient and outpatient cardiac services. Because 
of the sensitive nature of these files, requests to access them 
from qualified researchers trained in human subject confiden-
tiality protocols may be sent to the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services. For each study year from 2008 to 2014, 
we included fee-for-service beneficiaries if they had continu-
ous enrollment in Parts A and B in that year and the year prior 
(for purposes of comorbidity assessment). As in other stud-
ies,6,7 we also required that beneficiaries received at least 1 
primary care service (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding 
System codes 99 201 through 99 215, 99 304 through 99 350, 
G0402, G0438, and G0439) in the study year furnished by an 
ACO professional.
For each study year, we used International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision, codes to identify 2 cohorts (code lists 
available in the Appendix in the Data Supplement). The first 
cohort included beneficiaries for whom the value of coronary 
revascularization is widely considered to be lower.8 It included 
beneficiaries with evidence of stable, asymptomatic ischemic 
heart disease without concomitant diagnoses of angina, con-
gestive heart failure, or recent AMI hospitalization. For the 
second cohort, we identified beneficiaries for whom the value 
of coronary revascularization is generally regarded as higher.9 
This consisted of those admitted in a given year with a pri-
mary diagnosis of AMI.
Assigning Beneficiaries to Provider 
Groups Who Cared for Them
Next, we used 2-step to assign beneficiaries to provider groups 
(defined as primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals 
who care for common patients).10 First, we linked beneficia-
ries to their predominant ambulatory provider, defined as 
the primary care physician who furnished the most primary 
care services during a given year. For those who received 
no primary care services by any primary care physician, we 
assigned them to the specialist or nonphysician practitioner 
responsible for the most primary care services. Second, we 
linked all predominant ambulatory providers to the acute care 
hospital where they performed the plurality of their work dur-
ing the year. Providers who did not bill for any inpatient care 
were linked to the hospital where most of their patients were 
referred that year.
WHAT IS KNOWN
• Data on the early experience of Medicare account-
able care organizations (ACOs) with specialty care 
are sparse.
• Studies on a commercial ACO pilot and the first-
year performance of the Pioneer ACO Model Pro-
gram suggest that they may decrease utilization of 
lower value procedural care.
WHAT THE STUDY ADDS
• Regardless of a procedure’s value, its use was not 
altered by provider participation in a Medicare 
ACO.
• This suggests that the incentives of current Medi-
care ACO programs may be too weak to influence 
specialist physician behavior.
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Distinguishing Provider Groups 
Participating in a Medicare ACO
After determining the provider groups who cared for ben-
eficiaries with ischemic heart disease, we used the Leavitt 
Partners ACO Database to distinguish those participating in a 
Medicare ACO. This validated database has been in existence 
since 2010 and contained 839 Medicare, Medicaid, and 
commercial ACOs at the time of our analysis.11 Information 
on ACOs in the database is updated regularly from press 
releases, news articles, government announcements, con-
ferences, personal and industry interviews, and other public 
records. We considered a provider group to be participating 
in a Medicare ACO if the hospital where the primary care 
physicians and specialists in it delivered the plurality of their 
inpatient care was identified as either being owned by or 
affiliated with the ACO.
Measuring Rates of Coronary 
Revascularization
Our unit of analysis was quarterly provider group-level rates 
of total coronary revascularization for both of our cohorts. 
Among the cohort with asymptomatic ischemia, the numera-
tor for our rate calculation was the number of times in a study 
quarter that coronary artery bypass or percutaneous coro-
nary intervention (PCI; code lists available in the Appendix 
in the Data Supplement) was performed on a given provider 
group’s assigned beneficiaries. Of note, these procedures are 
largely done on an inpatient basis. The denominator cor-
responded to the number of the provider group’s assigned 
beneficiaries, who had a diagnosis of asymptomatic ischemia 
that same quarter.
Among the cohort with hospitalization for AMI during 
the calendar year (for whom revascularization is high-value), 
the numerator for our rate calculation was the number of 
times in a study quarter that coronary artery bypass grafting 
or PCI was performed on a given provider group’s assigned 
beneficiaries during hospitalization and up to 30 days after 
discharge. The denominator was the number of the provider 
group’s assigned beneficiaries, who were hospitalized that 
same quarter for AMI. Using previously described methods,12 
we risk-adjusted all rates using beneficiary-level covariates 
for age, sex, race/ethnicity, coexisting medical conditions 
(based on hierarchical condition categories13), and socioeco-
nomic status.14
Statistical Analysis
We first examined differences between ACO participating 
and nonparticipating provider groups with respect to the 
beneficiaries for whom they cared, using parametric and non-
parametric tests where appropriate. We also linked data from 
the American Hospital Association Annual Survey to compare 
groups based on characteristics of the hospitals where they 
delivered inpatient care, including hospital size, urbanicity, 
for-profit and teaching status, and region.15 Because capabil-
ity and capacity may influence intervention decisions, we lim-
ited our analysis to provider groups that performed at least 10 
PCIs and coronary artery bypass grafting procedures annually.
For both cohorts, we then plotted adjusted rates of 
total coronary revascularization in ACO participating and 
nonparticipating provider groups by study year. To test the 
statistical significance of rates of change in revascularization 
after ACO participation, we fit multivariable linear regression 
Table 1. Characteristics of ACO Participating and Nonparticipating 
Provider Groups
 
Participating 
(n=298)
Nonparticipating 
(n=1329) P Value
Characteristics of the provider group
  Contract start date
   2012 119 (39.9) NA NA
   2013 99 (33.2) NA NA
   2014 80 (26.9) NA NA
  Organizational type
   Physician-hospital 
partnership
160 (53.7) NA NA
   Hospital-led 103 (34.6) NA NA
   Physician-led 35 (11.7) NA NA
  Program type
   Medicare shared 
savings
272 (91.3) NA NA
   Pioneer ACO 
program
26 (8.7) NA NA
  Commercial ACO 
contract
   
   Yes 186 (62.4) NA NA
   No 112 (37.6) NA NA
  Medicaid ACO 
contract
   Yes 21 (7.1) NA NA
   No 277 (93.0) NA NA
Characteristics of the hospitals where provider groups deliver inpatient care
  Hospital size   0.0265
   Small 11 (3.7) 94 (7.1)  
   Medium 63 (21.1) 328 (24.7)  
   Large 224 (75.2) 907 (68.2)  
  For-profit hospital   <0.001
   Yes 30 (10.1) 327 (24.6)  
   No 268 (89.9) 1,002 (75.4)  
  Teaching hospital   0.0155
   Yes 53 (17.8) 166 (12.5)  
   No 245 (82.2) 1163 (87.5)  
  Urban hospital   0.1543
   Yes 298 (100.0) 1320 (99.3)  
   No 0 (0.0) 9 (0.7)  
  Geographic region   <0.001
   Northeast 55 (18.5) 178 (13.4)  
   Midwest 112 (37.6) 305 (22.9)  
   South 72 (24.2) 573 (43.1)  
   West 59 (19.8) 273 (20.5)  
Parentheses indicate percent. ACO indicates accountable care organization; 
and NA, not applicable.
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models (see Appendix in the Data Supplement for full model 
specification). We accounted for repeated measures by using 
generalized estimating equations with robust variance esti-
mators,16,17 weighted by the number of beneficiaries assigned 
to a group per quarter. Our models included a time-varying 
indicator for the group (set to 1 the quarter when a group 
began Medicare ACO participation and 0 otherwise) and 
covariates for the hospital characteristics described above. To 
address temporal trends, we introduced quarter and year as 
fixed effects.
To test the robustness of our findings, we conducted a 
series of sensitivity analyses. To see whether ACO effects 
differed between early and late adopters, we constructed 
separate models for groups with contract start dates in 
2012, 2013, and 2014. To examine whether a group’s orga-
nizational structure, degree of financial risk assumed (based 
on its participation in the Pioneer ACO or Medicare Shared 
Savings Program), or its participation in a commercial or 
Medicaid ACO contract were effect modifiers, we added 
interaction terms to our primary models. Because practice 
patterns may change with increased experience, we also 
fit models that included year lags for Medicare ACO par-
ticipation. Finally, we performed an exploratory analysis on 
provider groups in the Medicare Shared Savings Program to 
determine whether specialist participation (defined as the 
number of specialist physicians per 1000 beneficiaries in the 
ACO to which a given provider group belonged) modified 
ACO effects.
We performed all analyses using SAS Version 9.4 (Cary, 
NC). Tests were 2-tailed, and we set the probability of Type 1 
error at 0.05. The Health Sciences Institutional Review Board 
at our institution deemed this study to be exempt from its 
oversight.
RESULTS
We identified 298 provider groups that participated in a 
Medicare ACO contract at some point during the study 
interval and 1329 nonparticipating groups. As shown 
in Table 1, 40% were early ACO model adopters (ie, 
they had a contract start date in 2012). The overwhelm-
ing majority (91%) participated in the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (as opposed to the Pioneer ACO Pro-
gram). Most participating provider groups (53.7%) 
included hospital partners. Sixty-two percent were con-
currently in a commercial ACO, but only 7.1% also par-
ticipated in a Medicaid ACO contract.
Table 2 compares beneficiaries cared for by ACO par-
ticipating and nonparticipating provider groups during 
the precontract period. The distribution of asymptom-
atic ischemia was similar between groups, and differ-
ences in their beneficiaries’ age, sex, race/ethnicity, and 
level of comorbid illness were not clinically meaningful. 
However, beneficiaries cared for by nonparticipating 
groups tended to come from lower socioeconomic stra-
ta (P<0.01). Participating groups tended to practice at 
larger, not-for-profit, and teaching hospitals (Table 1). 
Furthermore, their hospitals were concentrated dispro-
portionately in the Northeast and Midwest.
Figure 1 displays adjusted rates (per 100 beneficiaries 
per year) of total coronary revascularization across par-
ticipating and nonparticipating provider groups (the for-
mer are stratified by their Medicare ACO contract start 
date). During the precontract period, rates of revascular-
ization among beneficiaries with asymptomatic ischemia 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Beneficiaries With Ischemic Heart Disease Cared for by ACO Participating and 
Nonparticipating Groups During the Precontract Period
Beneficiary Characteristic
Precontract Period (2008 to 2011)
Difference Between 
Groups During Precontract 
Period P Value
Participating 
(n=444 851)
Nonparticipating 
(n=1 715 606)
IHD cohort, % 0.23
  Stable ischemia 96.8 96.9  0.0
  Recent AMI 3.2 3.1  0.0
Mean age±SD, y 77.2±7.2 77.1±7.2 −0.1 <0.01
Female, % 46.2 45.6 0.6 <0.01
Race/ethnicity, % <0.01
  White 89.4 89.9 −0.5
  Black 6.6 5.8 0.8
  Hispanic 1.1 1.5 −0.4
  Other 2.9 2.9 0.0
Mean no. of HCCs±SD 1.9±1.7 1.9±1.7 0.0 0.81
SE stratum, % <0.01
  Low 25.0 33.6 −8.6
  Medium 32.7 33.6 −0.9
  High 42.3 32.8 9.5
ACO indicates accountable care organization; AMI, acute myocardial infarction; HCCs, hierarchical condition categories; 
IHD, ischemic heart disease; and SE, socioeconomic.
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(panel A) and those among beneficiaries hospitalized 
for AMI (panel B) were similar between participating 
and nonparticipating provider groups (lower value, 1.0 
versus 1.1, respectively; higher value, 53.9 versus 54.2, 
respectively). Over the study interval, although the rates 
of lower value revascularization remained relatively flat 
(from 1.0 in 2008 to 1.0 in 2014), rates of higher value 
revascularization rose, on average, by 13.5% (from 51.5 
in 2008 to 58.5 in 2014). For both cohorts, there was no 
noticeable separation of rates in participating provider 
groups after the start of an ACO.
As displayed in Table  3, our multivariable model 
results show that rates of change for low- and high-value 
coronary revascularization were not altered by a provider 
group’s participation in a Medicare ACO (lower value: 
difference, −0.04 per year; 95% confidence interval [CI], 
−0.11 to 0.03; higher value: difference, 0.96 per year; 
95% CI, −0.46 to 2.4). When considered separately, we 
noted similar findings when rates for coronary artery 
bypass grafting (lower value, difference, −0.01 per year; 
95% CI, −0.04 to 0.01; higher value, difference, 0.01 
per year; 95% CI, −0.9 to 0.9]) and PCI (lower value, dif-
ference, −0.02 per year; 95% CI, −0.08 to 0.03; higher 
value, difference, 0.7 per year; 95% CI, −0.8 to 2.2).
Figure 2 illustrates findings from our sensitivity analy-
ses. We observed no association between ACO partici-
pation and total coronary revascularization rates when 
we analyzed early and late model adopters separately. 
Group organizational structure, degree of financial risk, 
and commercial or Medicaid ACO participation did not 
modify Medicare ACO effects on rates of lower or high-
er value revascularization. When we examined organi-
zational learning effects by including year lags for ACO 
participation in our models, we noted decreases in the 
rates of lower value total coronary revascularization 
and PCI in year 2 (total: difference, −0.1; 95% CI, −0.2 
Figure 1. Rates of total coronary revasculariza-
tion among accountable care organization 
(ACO) participating and nonparticipating 
provider groups over the study interval for low- 
(A) and high-value (B) scenarios. Participating 
provider groups are stratified by contract start 
date. AMI indicates acute myocardial infarction.
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to 0.0; PCI: difference, −0.1; 95% CI, −0.2 to −0.0]), 
but this effect was not maintained in year 3. Finally, on 
our exploratory analysis, we found evidence suggesting 
that provider groups with high specialist participation 
may decrease rates of lower value revascularization (dif-
ference, −0.10 per year; 95% CI, −0.27 to 0.07) and 
increase rates of higher value revascularization (differ-
ence, 1.62 per year; 95% CI, −1.70 to 4.93), although 
these effects were not statistically significant.
DISCUSSION
For both low- and high-value scenarios, we found 
that rates of change for total coronary revasculariza-
tion, coronary artery bypass grafting, and PCI among 
beneficiaries treated by provider groups participating 
in a Medicare ACO contract were similar to those of 
beneficiaries treated by nonparticipating groups. These 
findings indicate that the incentives of Medicare Shared 
Savings Program and Pioneer may be too weak to limit 
the growth in spending on cardiac specialty care, and 
that refinements of current alternative payment models 
and risk-bearing contracts are needed to influence pro-
vider behavior.18
Data on the early experience of ACOs with special-
ty care are sparse; only 2 studies have examined ACO 
effects on specialty care delivery. The first was of an 
ACO pilot, comparing use of cardiovascular imaging 
and procedures among participating groups before and 
after implementation.19 Consistent with our results, the 
study’s authors found no evidence that the pilot had any 
effect on the use of lower value care.19 More recently, 
Schwartz and colleagues assessed the performance of 
Pioneer ACOs.20 In contrast to our results, they demon-
strated marginally significant but modest reductions in 
some lower value procedural care (eg, carotid endar-
terectomy for asymptomatic patients) during the pro-
gram’s first year.20
One reason why we observed no effects of Medi-
care ACOs on lower value coronary revascularization 
procedures is that these procedures are already infre-
quently performed. As such, ACO leaders may have 
chosen instead to focus on higher prevalence, lower 
value activities where more room for improvement 
exists. An alternative explanation has to do with the 
fact that participating provider groups, and particu-
larly specialists, have too little skin in the game. Spe-
cifically, most in our study were in 1-sided risk models 
that required no penalty for losses. Thus, the specialists 
participating in these ACOs may have limited incen-
tive to alter their practice patterns. A second explana-
tion pertains to a lack of specialist involvement. Half 
of Medicare ACOs have no formal arrangements with 
specialty practices.21 Given that ACO primary care 
physicians, by law, cannot restrict their beneficiaries’ 
care choices,22 weakly connected specialists may fall 
outside the reach of ACOs.
Our study has limitations that merit discussion. First, 
working with medical claims, we do not know ben-
eficiaries’ burden of symptoms. Therefore, we cannot 
comment on whether a given coronary revasculariza-
tion procedure was appropriate or not. Nevertheless, 
we can comment on the value of intervention. Indeed, 
other investigators have used frameworks similar to 
ours for estimating lower value PCI use with adminis-
trative data. Second, participation in a Medicare ACO 
is nonrandom and may be endogenous with organiza-
tional factors. Insofar as participating provider groups 
already had structures and processes in place before 
ACO implication to limit low-value procedure utiliza-
tion among specialists, our results would be biased. 
That said, we would expect the direction of this bias to 
be positive toward finding an effect of ACOs.
Table 3. Multivariable Model Examining the Relationship Between 
Provider Group Participation in a Medicare ACO and the Rate of 
Coronary Revascularization, Stratified by the Value of Intervention
Variable
Parameter Estimates for Percentage Change of 
Coronary Revascularization
Lower Value Higher Value
Coefficient (95% CI) Coefficient (95% CI)
Year (referent 2008)
  2009 0.03 (−0.01 to 0.07) 3.10 (2.14 to 4.06)
  2010 0.01 (−0.03 to 0.05) 4.01 (3.06 to 4.96)
  2011 −0.11 (−0.15 to −0.07) 4.55 (3.59 to 5.52)
  2012 −0.16 (−0.21 to −0.12) 5.17 (4.19 to 6.15)
  2013 −0.18 (−0.23 to −0.14) 6.41 (5.40 to 7.42)
  2014 −0.03 (−0.08 to 0.02) 6.30 (5.23 to 7.37)
Quarter (referent first)
  Second −0.09 (−0.11 to −0.07) −0.38 (−1.09 to 0.34)
  Third 0.14 (0.10 to 0.17) −1.14 (−1.85 to −0.42)
  Fourth 0.15 (0.11 to 0.19) −4.05 (−4.78 to −3.32)
Urban hospital (referent rural)
  Urban 0.31 (0.06 to 0.56) 0.83 (−2.16 to 3.83)
Teaching hospital (referent nonteaching)
  Teaching −0.15 (−0.23 to −0.08) 0.89 (−0.18 to 1.95)
Nonprofit hospital (referent for-profit)
  Nonprofit −0.02 (−0.10 to 0.06) 0.06 (−1.06 to 1.18)
Hospital region (referent Northeast)
  Midwest 0.45 (0.35 to 0.54) 5.20 (3.96 to 6.45)
  South 0.29 (0.22 to 0.37) 3.01 (1.77 to 4.24)
  West 0.30 (0.21 to 0.39) 4.13 (2.69 to 5.56)
Hospital size (referent small)
  Medium −0.17 (−0.33 to −0.01) −1.11 (−3.76 to 1.54)
  Large −0.21 (−0.36 to −0.06) −0.07 (−2.63 to 2.49)
First year participating in ACO (referent nonparticipating)
  ACO −0.04 (−0.11 to 0.03) 0.96 (−0.46 to 2.38)
ACO indicates accountable care organization; and CI, confidence interval.
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Third, we must acknowledge the possibility of mis-
classification bias from 2 sources. For one, we deter-
mined a provider group’s participation in a Medicare 
ACO based on where its primary care physicians and 
specialists delivered inpatient services. In addition, our 
method for categorizing the value of coronary revascu-
larization depends, in part, on the accuracy of providers’ 
diagnosis coding. However, we have reasons to think 
that the risk of this bias is low. When we compared 
results from our group ACO participation algorithm 
with data from the Shared Saving Program ACO Provid-
er-level research identifiable file, we observed that our 
assignment approached 90% accuracy. What is more, 
the rates of lower value PCI, which we observed are 
similar to those published elsewhere.23
Fourth, we concentrated on lower value procedures 
for ischemic heart disease only. We did so because 
these procedures are costly, accounting for $6 billion 
annually in Medicare spending and involve a diverse 
group of specialists, but we acknowledge that findings 
on them may not be generalizable to lower value care 
for other conditions. Finally, it is unclear whether our 
findings apply to alternative ACO models, emphasizing 
greater financial risk for providers.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings have 
important implications for clinician leaders and policy-
Figure 2. Differential changes in rates of 
coronary revascularization in low- and 
high-value scenarios based on accountable 
care organization (ACO) contract start date, 
organizational type, concurrent commercial 
or Medicaid contract, and experience.  
Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
AMI indicates acute myocardial infarction.
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makers. The focus of the initial iteration of Medicare 
ACOs has been on enhanced primary care for beneficia-
ries with multiple chronic medical conditions and com-
plex medical needs. This narrow focus has produced, at 
best, slight savings for Medicare. As suggested by our 
exploratory analysis, new more comprehensive designs 
that better incorporate specialists may be necessary if 
ACOs are to reach their full potential. Without such 
changes, the current Medicare ACO programs may 
struggle to control specialist costs.
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